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This paper conjectures a possible reduction of the conflict of
contrasting systems of values. Here, the Confucian social values and the
Christian religious values are taken as the objectives of our investigation,
due to their different and somewhat contrasting outlooks. My choice of
Christianity and Confucianism is, of course, not at random but intentional,
simply because they form an integral part of my life-world. I was born in
a society of pluralistic belief: I was nourished by Confucian values, but
raised up in Christian tradition and educated with Western scientific and
humanist knowledge. However, in order not to be fallen into the trap of
generality, I will deal more specifically with the concept of human dignity.
This work develops further the thesis that any reduction of conflict
can be possible if mankind share common values, have common interests
and are guided by common aspirations, in a word, if there exist human
commonalities. The thesis begins with an examination of the thesis of
diversity: our life-world is constituted by different values, interests, and
aspirations. That means the rightness (or the error) of any system of values
cannot be judged by the yardstick alien to their life-world. Hence, any
one-sided criticism of (either Chinese or Christian) values seems to
commit the so-called category-mistake. In this context, I would argue
along the line of Ludwig Wittgenstein, R. G. Collingwood, Martin
Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and others, that human dignity can be
understood in the context of their (our) life-world only. That means any
claim of a universal human dignity would complicate the matter more
than to help to settle down this conflict, since one has to foresee a universal
world before hand.
However, such a thesis would be of little help to reduce human
conflicts. Thus, I share the Hegelian (and of course, the Christian)
optimistic belief in the so-called forces of reason (or the force of hope in
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the Christian tradition, or the emancipatory interests in Habermas), and
conjecture a possible sensus communis as the basis for understanding.
The work consists of three main parts: the first part studies the
Confucian understanding of human dignity in its moral system, and the
second part reflects on its relevancy to a global society. In the first part,
we investigate the process of constitution of human dignity. It is evident
that such concept has been conceived, nourished, formed and developed
in the life-world of the people at Confucius’ time, i.e. the Springs-Autumn
period, cherished and developed further from generation to generation
and becomes an integral part of the Chinese life-world (and of other life-
worlds influenced by the Chinese one). The second part deals exactly
with the Christian view of human dignity, and with the claim of being
universal of the West. In the third part, we are searching for a possible
solution to the conflict of the Confucian and the Christian view of human
dignity.
Our argument is based on the insight that any understanding of
human dignity is primarily implicit in our understanding of human nature
which is constituted and reconstituted in-and-from our life-worlds. In
the second part reflecting on the relevancy of the Chinese concept of
human dignity, I argue for a possible contribution of the Confucian
concept of human dignity to the world. The fact that the world is right
now becoming a global village - which demands for better mutual
understanding, reciprocal activity (solidarity) and more communication
(in the sense of Habermas’ theory of communicative action) - would fortify
our belief in the possibility of a common understanding of human dignity.
Human dignity would no longer be the product of a particular culture,
but rather a human common aspiration for an ideal world. In this sense,
human dignity cannot be cut off from divinity, which, in its original sense,
expresses human deepest and insatiable desire for perfection.
Keywords: Christian philosophy, Asian philosophy, Confucian
human dignity, human nature, life-world, human self-perfection, theory
of communicative action, Confucius, Thomas Aquinas, Wittgenstein,
Collingwood, Heidegger, Gadamer, Habermas.
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Remarking  Introduction:
Human  Rights,  Human  Nature  and  Human  Dignity
The issue of human rights has been the main concern of mankind;
it constitutes the kernel of all cultural traditions, especially of great
religions.1 With Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and then with the success of a
series of revolutions, from the American Revolution to the French
Revolution, from the Labour Revolution to the Bolshevik Revolution
(1917), from the Hsin-hai Revolution (1911) to the Movement of
liberation, human rights becomes today the most cherished, most sacred
objectives sought by humankind. The irony is, no one can say precisely
what human rights mean; no society can offer their exact criteria; and
there is no warrant of a certain concept of human dignity acceptable to
all human beings. What we are witnessing is a constantly shameful abuse
of human rights, an often biased, one-sided and even cynical
understanding of human dignity. Human rights, human dignity, people
power, etc., all are but sheer slogans often perniciously abused to cheat
on the people, and to be misused as a tool to grab, to defend and to expand
power. Ironically, precisely the same ones who most loudly advocate
human rights, who fiercely champion human dignity are their worst
offenders. They jealously keep these rights to them by denying other
people, other religions, other races, other cultures, etc. from these rights.2
To be more precise, the issue of human rights has been taken as a weapon
to inflict wound on (or in many case, more brutally, to destroy) those
who stubbornly resist the super-powers, the states, and the likes. If peace
in the past is pax romana (the roman peace), then today, human rights
may be just either jus sovieticum (the Soviet justice claimed by Stalinists),
or jus sinicum (the Chinese justice of Mao Dze-dung) and today, jus
americanum (the American justice), or in a broader context, jus
occidentalis (the Western justice). On the name of human rights, these
powerful states, governments, or persons have destroyed the rights of
other people, without ever questioning which rights they possess, which
are the rights other people have and need. In bottom, to say in the manner
of Blaise Pascal’s sarcastic remark of reason, and Anatole France’s
mockery at the concept of justice,3 human rights are mistreated as the
whores serving everyone: aggressors find in them the best tools to suppress
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their victims, while, on the other side, the suppressed may abuse them as
a no less destructive weapon to wage a merciless battle against their
oppressors.
The controversy on human rights may be born in human different,
even conflicting understanding of human nature, and of course, on human
lack of respect for humankind. Thus, a reduction of human rights abuse
demands first a minimizing misunderstanding of human nature, and then
an increasing of respect for human dignity. That means, any discourse
on human rights requires a further discourse on human nature, and any
discourse on human nature suggests a concern for human dignity. Since
these issues are well debated I would prefer to tackle on a relatively
small aspect of our understanding of human dignity. As an Asian born
in and nourished by Asian cultural heritage, especially by the Confucian
values, and educated in the Western knowledge and Christian faith, our
own understanding, in the strictest sense, rather reflects my personal
modus vivendi, which is inseparable from these two great traditional
cultures. From my own living experience (Erlebniss), I am fully convinced
of a possible fusion of two quite contrasting systems of values. Thus, the
title “A Confucian-Christian Understanding of Human Dignity”
represents my personal search and answer to the above question. It does
not pretend to claim any common understanding among all Asians, or
even among Chinese, as the title of my paper hints. I will concentrate on
the Confucian values in particular, partly because I am more or less
directly nourished by them, and partly due to my lack of a solid knowledge
of Taoism and Buddhism.
The paper consists of three main parts: the first part investigates
the concept of human dignity expounded in the main doctrines of
Confucianism, the second part deals with the Christian concept of human
dignity as seen in the constitution of Lumen gentium promulgated by the
Council Vatican II,4 while the third part would reflect on its relevancy to
our Asian society in the global age. This part, in a certain sense, is an
attempt to incorporate the Confucian concept of human dignity into the
Christian concept of human dignity in a broader and more integral way,
to make it universal. In the conclusion, we argue that human dignity
should be understood in the context of the process of human participation
into the process of self-perfection.
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Part  1
A  Confucian  Understanding  of  Human  Dignity
Confucius was certainly not concerned with typical metaphysical
question on human nature and its foundation. He was rather obsessed
with practical question of human self-realisation.5 Thus, not the question
of what is human nature but that of how do we recognise man as a man,
and more importantly, of how to make man as man, has been the objectives
ardently sought by him. And indeed, in The Analects, almost no clear-
cut definition of human beings, God or human nature was given.6 The
master even refused to answer to those who questioned him on matters of
deity and evil.7 Whenever Confucius had to refer to human nature, he
would opt for a valuation and not a description. The Analects devote 6
paragraphs to deal with human nature,8 but none of them could be
regarded as a definition of it in the strictest sense. The reason of why
Confucius resisted temptation to make any definition of human nature is
quite simple: human nature can be known only as long as the actual man
is living, i.e. thinking, sensing, and especially acting in a certain
circumstance, a certain community. That means, one would understand
man as long as one be able to participate into this kind of living,9 or as
his followers insisted, to follow the way (Tao) of living.10 Hence the
important issue here is what does Confucius mean by human life? To
express Confucian thought in modern languages, one would say that
Confucius might have understood human nature in a process of growth
in toto (moral, intellectual as well as physical growth). Thus to him, any
demand for an exact understanding of human nature by birth (or a priori)
is superfluous, and even dangerous (as we later witness with Mencius
and Hsun-tze, who had attempted in vain to understand human nature in
se as innate goodness or original evil).11
If human nature is understood in its total aspects, then one has to
arrive at a conclusion that human dignity reflects this human totality.
Such a conclusion seems to be a little bit adventurous, if not dangerous,
if one has no idea of what Confucius meant by human totality. Thus, we
need to go a step further to pinpoint what we mean by total aspects, and
their difference.
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First, one might argue that human dignity rather reflects the values
aspect, since it is this aspect that makes man transcending animals. That
means that not all aspects are equally essential. That is true to some
extent. Confucius himself had made clear of the distinction of human
various aspects: the survival and the moral, and he seemed to lay more
weight on the latter, when he regarded the noble man (chun-tzu) with
noble deeds as the true representative of authentic humanity (existence).12
Actually, such an understanding was not false, but only partial correct.
Confucius never neglected the aspect of survival.13 But he was fully aware
of the fact that not all aspects are equally essential, that it would be
necessary to classify them in the order of values: the survival and the
progress, or in Confucius’ own words, the basic needs, the need for security
and humanity.14 Only when forced to make a final choice, then one would
opt for the values of higher order.15 Following Confucius’ idea, I would
like to propose to distinguish human existence into the bare existence
and the authentic existence (to borrow the language of Soren A.
Kierkegaard and Jean-Paul Sartre). Human bare existence is often
understood as material life, while authentic life as spiritual (moral,
aesthetic) life. Bare existence is possible if basic needs for survival are
met, while authentic existence requires values of higher order, the one of
progress. That means in order to be human in its full sense, i.e. to be an
animal par excellence, a bare existence is insufficient. To be human
demands to have an authentic existence that requires a life of values.
Second, if human existence consists of bare existence (with
survival values) and authentic existence (defined by values of higher
order), and if as Confucius insisted, the last one would be prevalent, then
one may argue that human dignity, as the value of higher order, would be
more prevalent. As corollary, culture (arts), spiritual values, and moral
values are not essential to human bare existence (since man can survive
without them), but categorically necessary for human dignity.
Third, as a logical consequence of such a distinction, human
nature (which consists of bare existence and authentic existence) is not
equal to human dignity (which refers to the authentic existence). Human
dignity hence expresses the value of human existence, and certainly not
identified with it. Human dignity can be possible only if man can find an
adequate answer to the question concerning the reason of our own
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existence. Confucius made this point very clear in his distinction between
the superior man (noble, worthy man) and the inferior man (little means
man), as we have pointed out earlier. Now we can understand of the
reason why Confucius set his mind on the practical program of human
self-realisation, i.e. on the value of human progress: “Let the ruler be a
ruler, the minister be a minister, the father be a father, and the son be a
son.”16 He was fully conscious of the fact that without human dignity,
then all of our attempts of a bare existence would be meaningless: “The
duke said, “Excellence! Indeed when the ruler is not a ruler, the minister
not a minister, the father not a father, the son not a son, although I may
have all the grain, shall I ever get to eat it?”17
Now, the question is whether such view of human dignity could
be practical, and whether it could be acceptable to us in the age of
globalization? Any claim of a definitive answer to these questions is too
premature, since it involves our awareness of the diversity of life-worlds,
of the gradual (or even sudden) transformation of our own life-world,
and certainly of our knowledge of the possible future. Furthermore, we
are aware of the fact that nobody can remain fully autonomous even if
he deliberately chooses to be so, and that no system of values could claim
to remain monolithic. We all become global, consciously or
unconsciously, willingly or unwillingly. If so, then any understanding of
human dignity from a single, pure, and monolithic system of values is no
longer sufficient. It could become reactionary, dangerous for human
progress. As history testifies, the jealous defence of monolithic Confucian
values of the conservative Confucians in the later Man-Ching had done
great damage to Confucian humanism, reducing it into a kind of rigid
ideology, impeding human progress, and hence offending human dignity.
Aware of this treacherous ideology, I am inclined towards the view that,
a modern Confucian understanding of human dignity must be interpreted
in accordance with the spirit of authentic existence and with the actual
modus vivendi of the Chinese (Far Eastern) people. In other words, the
idea of a globalization of Confucian moral system seems to be rather
adventurous (and even dangerous). In contrast, I argue that a Confucian
(living in a global age) may further the Confucian insistence on human
progress (in terms of searching for higher values). And as such, he has to
incorporate into the Confucian body any system of values that contributes
80  Prajñâ Vihâra
to human progress and renders human values more universal, eternal
and perfect. Here is the reason of my investigation into the system of
Christian values, and my search for a kind of fusion of two systems of
values, in the sense of a fusion of horizons, once proposed by Hans-
Georg Gadamer (1900-2002).18
Part  2
The  Western  Understanding  of  Human  Dignity
2.1. The Christian Concept of Human Dignity
The concept of human dignity in Lumen gentium is based on the
metaphysical principles of human nature as imago Dei (The image of
God),19 and of human community (ecclesia) as a communion of God and
humankind: “Signum et instrumentum intimae cum Deo unionis totiusque
generis humani unitatis” (the sign and instrument of an intimate union
with God and of a unity of all human beings).20 As creature created in
accordance with the image of the Creator, human nature is similar to the
divine nature. Hence, if human dignity means to be worth of being human,
then it does mean also to be worth of being divine.21
The point here is, if human nature is made after the divine nature
- the image of God-then what is the nature of God, and why only human
beings (and not all creatures) are created after His image. These questions
force us to put our faith in the bracket (to follow phenomenological
method) and to venture into the sphere of human understanding. Whether
we can understand the nature of God, as well as His Will by means of
rational arguments?
Let us not return to the whole history of how philosophers dealt
with this question, and concentrate on a point, namely, up to our times,
no answer (given by whomever) is definitively final. The safest way seems
to adopt the Kant’s strategy of excluding the sphere of faith from rational
discussion. But, such a strategy backfires. As Kant himself conceded, it
does not help much to our understanding of human beings as such. It
rather leads us to a certain agnosticism that excludes all human activities
except the knowing activity. Thus, I would argue that even though faith
is not identified with human capacity (or faculty) of understanding, they
are inseparable. In my view, understanding expresses our approach to
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faith. And our understanding may consist of the so-called the rational
understanding based either on the common sense, or on rational basis, or
on our own personal life, personal feeling, and so on. To put in a
straightforward word, the same faith can be expressed in different ways,
often rational and consistent, but sometimes contradictory and even
irrational.
Let us return to the question of what is the nature of God, or how
do we know that the nature of God is as such? The Scholastic tradition
would prove by means of an analogia, that man as an image of God, i.e.
a part of the Absolute God, would bear the same characteristics of the
Absolute, though in lesser, imperfect and partial degree. St. Augustine’s
argument of the ray and the source of light (theory of illuminatio) may
at best present this Neo-Platonic theory.22 Analogically, one may argue
that (in accordance with Aristotle), since God is the Absolute, the Logos,
the Perfect, then human nature (as a part participating in God) is tending
towards the Absolute (transcendence), then it is rational, and then it is
guided by moral principles.
Such an a priori argument would give little light on the divine
nature, and of course, would hardly produce any proof, strong enough to
ascertain the existence of God. It requires before hand a certain faith,
which cannot be rationally understood, much less to be proved. The
argument of credo qui absurdum seems to be of no value in persuading
rationalists. The Thomist approach tried to avoid this embarrassing
conclusion when it chose the rational path. To Aquinas, the idea of God
must be proved a posteriori, through a careful examination of the works
of God, namely nature. Since, he argues, if nature is created by God, it
must bear some of His imprint. In other words, one may know the
existence of God by knowing nature (in its form, structure, order, and so
on). If there is a certain order, if anything happens must have some cause
(because nothing can be the cause of itself), if there is a scale of value,
etc. then there must exist a certain perfect order, the causa in se, the
source of values, etc. In a word, God is precisely the absolute order, the
final cause, the value in se, etc.23
Here one has to make a short note: Aquinas did not demonstrate
God in se. He wants to show us the cause for believing in the presence of
God. Thus, his arguments are not directly based on God in se but on the
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presence (appearances) of God in the world.24 His arguments (in his so-
called five proofs) can be resumed in a sentence: if the world and all
beings are created by God, then the world must be reflecting His will,
then the world must display his presence. Consequently, the order we
found in the world reflects the divine order. Similarly, human desire for
happiness is unlimited. But any happiness may short live, in the sense
that it can satisfy us only temporally. And as such, it cannot be the ultimate
happiness, which human beings are seeking. The idea of a God emerges
here as the ultimate Happiness, i.e. as the Cause of all kinds of happiness.
If one follows the Neo-Platonians (like Plotinus and St.
Augustine), then the orders in the world are only the rays of light which
are coming from the Sun. God is the Sun i.e. the source of all rays. The
ray may be diminished, or disappeared, but not its source. Similarly, the
order in the world may be imperfect, but not the legislator who made
orders. This theory of emanatio (initiated by Plotinus) is the backbone
of the above mentioned arguments: it points out the existence of a perfect
state, a perfect order. God is conceived by as the Creator of these orders.
Thus He must be perfect, absolute.
As an image of God, and as the chosen people of God, human
beings are called to live up to this divine image. They are called to fulfill
the sacred mission assigned by God to them. Or more precisely, they are
assigned the responsibility to build a regnum Dei (the reign of God), or
a civitas Dei i.e. a perfect society (the city of Jerusalem as St. Augustine
explicitly named) after the model of the world which reveals the nature
of God: “The very order, disposition, beauty, change and motion of the
world and of all visible things silently proclaim that it could only have
been made by God, the ineffably and invisibly great and the ineffably
and invisibly beautiful.”25
If God is known by His nature, and if His nature is displayed in
the world, then one might say that, the divine nature can be discovered
precisely in nature. But such a conclusion seems to be rather Spinozian.
As most of theologians agree, the world reveals only a part of the divine
nature. Thus, what we know about God is only a partial knowledge.
There is no complete picture of God. And even such partial knowledge is
not directly apprehended, but only by means of an analogy (and by means
of a pure speculation). In this sense, the nature of man reflects a part of
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the divine nature. First, since God is the creator of man, then man is His
product (or His image). But God is by no means identified with man,
and man could never become God. As an image, man reflects only a part,
incomplete part of God. There man is imperfect. In this sense, the imperfect
is a characteristic of man and not of God. Thus, any defect, incomplete,
insufficient… could not belong to the nature of God. Aquinas’ via
negativa clearly demonstrates that what God is not. That means, human
nature could not be identified with the divine nature, simply because
human nature is full of defects. In contrast, the divine nature must be the
perfect, good in se, self-sufficient, etc.
If we follow Aquinas to the letter, then the argument regarding
human dignity as worth of being divine seems to be inconsistent. How
could a part become the whole, the defect to be transformed into the
perfect, the finite to be the infinite? The inability to give a satisfactory
answer would persuade us to return to Augustinism: man is worthless
before God; he can never become God (with an exception of course, of
the Nietzschean madman who proclaims himself to be God). Unwillingly,
we have to go back to the starting point and content with it: human dignity
means worth of being human.
Now it is clear that Aquinas might have proposed a different view
of human dignity, namely, that human nature in se is orienting towards
perfection, and human dignity can be seen in human act of following this
nature. The act of refusal of this nature leads to what we might label as
human indignity. Since, as we have seen, Aquinas’ proofs of the divine
existence point out rather the difference between man and God. Thus,
human dignity cannot be understood in the sense of worthiness of being
divine, because it would tacitly accept an identity of God and man. To
follow Aquinas’ spirit, we may have to understand human dignity not in
the framework of the logical identity, but of the logic of faith: the concept
of human dignity is built on our knowledge of humanity and on our faith
in God. On the one hand, the knowledge of humanity suggests that man
is man simply because he has the capacity to transcend natural world to
become better. In this sense, his nature is defined by his progress. The
language of faith, on the other hand, would prove that if God is omniscient,
omnipresent, omnipotent, the Good in se, etc. then as His image, i.e. as
someone most close to God, human nature should be in some way more
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close to His nature. Thus, to become holy means to become better.
Similarly, human vocation is the call to become perfect. As a finite
proceeding towards the infinite, human nature means a dynamic essence
(dynamos) possessing the energy (energeia), not at the static stage but
proceeding (or developing) towards the perfect (telos). To say in the
language of faith, we are called to become perfect. Hence, to become
perfect is the essence of humanity.
2.2. The Western Claim
As we see, the history of human understanding of God, and of
the concept of human dignity in the constitution Lumen gentium, and
other documents of the Vatican II yields a view of monolithic character:
the character of Western thinking. The triumph of the West in the fields
of sciences, military and economics has consolidated its own character
and constituted its own self-consciousness (as Hegel had fabricated: the
world is the West, and its soul is Christianity, its spirit is reason, its form
is science and its force is economics. As corollary, the West dogmatically
dismissed or arrogantly downgraded the views (values) of other cultures.
Of course, such monolithic, iconoclast view is no longer shared by even
Western intellectuals. R. G. Collingwood is not the only gentleman who
once warned the West: “Savages are no more exempt from human folly
than civilized men, and are no doubt equally liable to the error of thinking
that they, or the person they regard as their superiors, can do what in fact
cannot be done. But this error is not the essence of magic. And we should
be careful how we attribute it to the people we call savages, who will one
day raise up and testify against us.”26 Much earlier, the legendary Matteo
Ricci had eloquently testified the greatness of a China, just as great
missionaries like De Nobili had brilliantly demonstrated the grandeur of
Indian civilization. A Voltaire, a Leibniz, a Schopenhauer, a Legge, a
Wilhelm, and other great Occidental learners, were certainly not the only
and the last ones who wholeheartedly echoed the view of these
missionaries. Since, it is not our scope to argue for the greatness of other
non-Western cultures; it is sufficient to limit our work in unearthing the
source of biases in the world of Western philosophers.
To avoid any possible and unnecessary misunderstanding, it is
important, however, to make a short clarification: my criticism of some
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views of some Western philosophers does not mean my objection to
Western values. Quite in contrast, I am fully aware that nobody would
be foolish, or too radical to throw away the Western values. In fact, there
is some truth in the claim of the West: their triumph was possible due to
its own character. However, such triumph could not be the backbone of
its universal claim, and much less demonstrate its universality as Hegel
had done in vain in his immortal (but very controversial) Phenomenology
of Spirit.27 Thus we have to turn now to the second question of whether
such concept could be regarded as universal, or whether it is rather a
particular product of the Church fathers (and of theologians of the Western
world, or Western educated theologians). The answer to this question is
of important significance, because, in our view, biblical understanding
advocated first by Martin Luther, and recently by theologians of, from
and for the world outside Vatican,28 has been rather the fruit of their
world. To borrow Hegelian expression, their view reflects the spirit of
their age (Zeitgeist) and their people (Volksgeist). Thus, the condemnation
of their view by the Sacra Congregazione della dottrina della Fede in
the past, and even in recent days,29 may be understood as an objection to
(possible) understanding of the message of God of the world outside the
Vatican, or in a broader sense, outside the Western world.
As we have seen, the concept of human dignity has been
constructed in the womb of the Greco-Roman culture, guided by the
Christian spirit, nourished by the thoughts of the Church fathers, and
developed by modern Western philosophy. More concretely, the concept
of human dignity defended by the Vatican II may be regarded as a
synthetic product of the following traditions: the Homeric tradition of
regarding the divine world and the human world as homogeneous, the
Judaic tradition of considering human beings as the image of God (and
the Israel as His selected people), the Christian tradition of believing in
Christ as the son of God and the son of man, and the Western modern
idea of equality among all people. The point now is, whether such a
synthetic view could represent other traditions, say the Chinese tradition,
the Indian tradition, the African tradition, and others, or, more universally,
whether it could include all traditions. Since, as we may agree, we would
not be able to understand the concept of human dignity if we do not have
any idea of the culture in which the idea of human dignity is born; and
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certainly much less can we perform it, or obey its laws, or apply it in our
own life-world, if it is alien to us.30
Here I have to repeat once again that I do not deny the effort (and
the merit) of our Church fathers in searching for such a synthesis. My
suspicion is about their claim of a final and complete synthesis that is
theirs and theirs only. As an Asian, nourished in the womb of Chinese
culture (and partly Buddhist culture),31 my reflection begins with whether
the concept of human dignity understood by our Church fathers reflects,
or represents our Asian understanding of human dignity? If it does, then
the claim of universal may be justified for Asians (of course, not yet for
other peoples). If not, then such a claim is still questionable, or at least
not definitive.
In order to avoid misunderstanding, it is very important to clarify
here that my question focuses on the claim of universality of the concept
of human dignity and not of that of truth. As I have previously pointed
out the distinction between faith and understanding, so I have to accept
that the sphere of understanding is not identified with that of truth. The
same truth may be understood quite differently, and consequently,
interpreted in different ways.
Let us return to the definition of human dignity: human dignity
means to be worth of human beings. No doubt, such definition does add
nothing new to our understanding of human dignity, since it is rather of
tautological essence. But no doubt, no one would question its correctness
either. Thus, it would be superfluous to treat such definition in se and
waste time for such an answer. One has to venture beyond to pose a
series of questions concerning the meaning of worthiness of being human
like what we mean by human nature, whether human nature is an image
of the divine nature, and why should we live up to this nature. Since I am
rather concerned with Confucian understanding of human dignity, and
of whether such an understanding is compatible with the concept of human
dignity promulgated and defended by the Vatican II (as we have presented
in the second part of this paper), I would like to tackle the problem from
two angles: their compatibility and the possibility of a fusion of them.




In this section, I will follow Thome Fang’s and Fu Pei-jung’s
analysis of the concept of life in the Analects to some extent, to make
clear the divergence between Christianity and Confucianism in matters
of human life, and human dignity.
The first difference between the Christian view and the Confucian
view of life lies in its metaphysical foundation: the Ursprung of life and
its importance. If life, in the Christian belief, is created by God, then it is
inseparable from the divine life. It is not us but God who determines our
life. As consequence, life itself matters little, because it can be given, or
taken away by its Creator. In this context, it is not life but its Ursprung
must be human concern. The Confucian view of life does not object to
this view (Confucius’ avoid to tackle this problem does not mean his
objection), but it does not regard it as essential to our understanding of
life either. It rather concentrates on life itself, and certainly on its process,
putting aside its metaphysical Ursprung. As a matter of fact, Confucians
do rather question the metaphysical foundation of life; they would prefer
to ponder on practical question of living.32 In the context of process, life
is producing life in the way of self-generating.33 Thus, it is a matter of
urgency to follow the natural way of this process (The Tao of I-king, the
Taoist Tao), or to correct human behaviour to follow this Tao.
The second difference lies in the attitude towards life. To the
Confucian, a true human being does not contradict, jeopardise, or destroy
one’s own life. And it is also true with regard to the life of others. Thus,
one knows a man worthy of being human only by his conducts which
fulfill the aims of human life: preservation, prolong and development of
life.34 But life can be preserved, prolonged and developed not by one’s
own force alone, since it cannot be separated from the cosmic force which
encompasses heavenly force (tien), earthly force (ti) and human force
(ren). That means human life generates its own life by the co-operative
force of other lives (the cosmic life, human life, etc.). In a single word,
life is possible only by means of other lives.35 Thus, one may say with
confidence that human life is primarily cosmic life and social life. In this
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context, human nature is known as first cosmic nature and then as social
nature. Similarly, human essence is firstly cosmic essence and then as
social essence. In the Christian view, life is given by God, and rooted in
God, therefore, man has no right to claim over one’s own life. Even human
participation in the divine life is not an act of human self-developing, but
a special grace bestowed on them by God. Evidently, the Christian man
is rather passive in comparison with the active Confucian man.
Furthermore, as the logical consequence of human self-generation
and self-determination, the meaning of human life is determined by one’s
own contribution to this social essence. In other words, human nature
cannot be understood albeit from social nature, since man reveals oneself
through one’s own social acts, or better say, by means of one’s contribution
to the growth of humanity.36 Here is the reason why Confucius reserved
most times to the theme of humanity (jen), to the ways of being human
(superior man, filial piety, righteousness, etc.).37 These themes are
concerned with human acts in a society. Better say, they are the practical
categories, which any human being as a social being must take. Not quite
in the same line, Christian view is centred on the divine grace and
salvation. One cannot, due to human sin, free oneself from the external
and internal conditions. Thus, only by divine grace or by the intervention
of God that man would be liberated. The incarnation of Jesus Christ and
his redemption clearly indicate that man by himself is incapable of
determinating his own fate. This dogma also suggests that while the
substance of man is divine, his social nature is rather of accident character.
The dualist separation of soul from body unmistakably sidelines the needs
of human body, which constitute an essential part of human world. Of
course, this dogma has been slightly changed by the Council fathers,
when they adopted the view of social nature as a manifestation of divine
nature. Nevertheless, its substantial part remains intact, namely, human
nature is divine, prior to the fall of Adam and after the redemption.
3.2. Christian View and the Confucian View of Life.
I will not delve into their analysis of the difference between
Christianity and Confucianism in general, which is quite interesting but,
nonetheless, irrelevant for our discussion here. Thus, for the sake of brevity
and for a fruitful discussion, and as a logical consequence of the concept
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of human nature as social essence, one may venture to argue that human
dignity must be understood in the following contexts:
Firstly, since human nature is shaped in the process of living, and
since human beings are different by birth,38 then in order to attain this
social essence, education is necessary: “By nature men are alike. Through
practice they have become apart.”39 Education is an art of living, in the
sense of living in accordance with human nature, social nature and the
world nature.
Secondly, Confucius insists on the fact that human nature can be
evaluated by social (moral) standards. Thus, to him, to obey rules, to
respect social orders, to execute duty… contribute to what we may regard
as human dignity.
Thirdly, social standards, laws are not beyond human capacity.
They are for human beings and not the reverse.40 Thus human dignity
can be known through our most noble principles of existence, co-existence,
and progress, just as in the more negative forces, which do harm to human
existence, and human progress.
From these main currents of thought, one easily finds that human
nature is regarded not as something inborn, innate but as substantial
products in the living process. If this view can represent the so-called
Eastern view, then it seems to be quite different, if not contrast to the
West-Christian view of human nature as imago Dei, i.e. a pre-planned,
pre-determined and unchangeable nature which human beings cannot
change by any means. If there were some change, then this would be
rather a change for worse, a change that is interpreted as original sin, the
sinful decadence of humanity. Of course, the difference between Chinese
culture and Christian culture is not only seen in their different view on
human nature. This is only one of many controversial points,41 which are
sufficient to make doubtful the claim of universal of the West.
The above mentioned differences are only a part of a deeper
divergence that discourages any claim of a universal view on human
nature. Despite this seemingly unbridgeable divergence, it seems to me
that Lumen gentium had let the door open for more reasonable
interpretation concerning human nature. It had made a tremendous
progress in comparing to the old dogmas promulgated by earlier Councils,
especially by the Council of Trent (1545-1563), or declared and enforced
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by the so-called Magisterium. Due to the limit of this discussion, I will
not repeat here the major contribution of Lumen gentium to human
understanding and to promote human dignity that I have referred
elsewhere.42 I would prefer to conclude my paper with a conjecture of a
possible convergence of different views, kind of a fusion of different
horizons which Gadamer has projected in his now becoming classical
work: Truth and Method.43
Conclusion
The Possibility of a Common Understanding of Human Dignity
Gadamer’s thesis of the fusion of horizons exposed in Truth and
Method and in other works44 can be resumed in following main tenets:
- First, each tradition (each culture, each historical
consciousness, each life) is like a horizon. In Gadamer’s own words,
horizon expresses or displays the “range of vision that includes everything
that can be seen from a particular vantage point.”45
- Second, horizon changes with our own move, just as the range
of vision is changing with the change of our life, or more exactly, with
the change of our life-world. The change usually takes the form of
widening (in space), or broadening (in terms of consciousness), and
deepening. That means, the more our life-world is extending, the wider
is our vision, the deeper is our consciousness, and the richer is our life.
That is, the more cultures we encounter, the richer, wider, and deeper is
our life-world.
- Third, the widening, broadening and deepening of horizon
follows a dialectical path: the next stage (vision) absorbs the actual stage
and previous stages, just as the actual present stage includes all previous
stages. Of course, this kind of synthesis is not a non-reflective
mathematical summing up, but a selective one, in the sense of Hegel’s
Aufhebung.
- As such, human beings always possess a certain horizon, and
his (her) horizon is permanently changing in the sense of self-enriching,
self-broadening, self-deepening, and the like. The point here is such an
expansion of horizon could be possible if and only if one has to move up,
i.e. to expand one’s own life by going into other cultures (or life-worlds).
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The more one advances, the more one discovers one’s horizon expanding;
the more one is rooted in other life-worlds, the more one is deepening
one’s own horizon, and so on. To apply to culture, we can say analogously:
the more cultures we learn, the wider is our life-world; the more open we
are, the more possibility we may encounter; the deeper we dig in traditions,
the deeper is our own historical consciousness.
Of course, not all human beings are able to expand their horizons,
and not all horizon-expansion takes the dialectical course. Followers of
Marx would rightly doubt Gadamer’s over-optimistic expectation, by
arguing that these horizons (cultures, religions) might have been
manufactured (fabricated), falsified or instrumentalised; that we might
have been alienated by the same cultures we are born in, etc. If so, then
the so-called expansion of horizon is rather a regression back into the
“darkness” of pre-Enlightenment ages (Habermas’ criticism of Gadamer).
In my view, Habermas’ over caution of Gadamer’s “uncritical” and
“unreserved” attitude in favor of horizon-fusion has served as a good
warning. However, in bottom, as Habermas himself conceded later (after
his debate with Gadamer in the later 1970s), that his over-zealous defense
of the so-called force of reason (of the Enlightenment) does not contradict
the Hegelian insight that the spirit is in a permanent process toward the
absolute, and that its process follows dialectical path.46 If so, then what
Habermas insisted is nothing new with regard to Gadamer’s proposal.
Only one thing worth to be said is his insistence on reason as the guiding
force behind the any act of fusing.
Following Gadamer, and in line with traditione catholica, my
reflective conclusion is, in the strictest sense, not a conclusion but, in
contrast, an invitation for further reflection on the concept of human
dignity. My main thesis is as follows: if human dignity means what is
constituting human essence, and if this essence cannot be separated from
other essences (the physical, the social, the spiritual, etc.), and if these
essences form human nature, then any definition of human dignity in
terms of divinity, or pure humanity, or in its material essence alone is
perhaps incomplete and, consequently, misleading. Just as any definition
of human nature in terms of a single essence is rather dogmatic. One has
to search for a more encompassing understanding of the concept of human
dignity, divinity and humanity. As a corollary of my tentative proposal
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to understand human nature as social essence - which reflects human
deep and eternal aspiration for self-perfection by means of mutual,
reciprocal and communicative activities - I would venture to go a further
step by arguing that the concept of human dignity, thanks to the new
discovery of archeologists, anthropologists and biologists, has been
significantly modified in the last century. Similarly, the Christian
Churches have made a revolution in redefining human beings, no longer
in terms of immortality but also in terms of our existential worlds. As we
have argued elsewhere, the concept of human dignity in Lumen gentium
(the constitution of the Catholic Church) is going through a process of
self-renovating (aggiornamento), self-enriching, and self-bettering by
means of cultural fusions. The recent apostolic exhortation of John-Paul
II to the Asian Bishops Conference, Ecclesia in Asia (The Church in
Asia, 1999), most vividly reflects this wide and deep change: human
nature, and consequently, human dignity must be understood in the context
of human common concern, common vocation, and common aspiration
for perfect life,47 which is implicitly found in almost all cultures.
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